The nature of self

[Sobek]

What, exactly, is the "self"?

Is it the collection of memories? Is it attitudes and personality? Is it our relationships? Is it something about our physical body?

Take the Star Trek transporter than disintegrates then reintegrates you. Is that a transfer of self, or some sort of spiritual clone?

If you could download all your memories into a positronic brain-type computer immediately before your body died, would you still be alive? Would the computer be you? What if your body didn't die and you just copied yourself?

What if, after death, all our memories are merged into a collective unconscious? Would that be continuity of self? What if your memories were pulled back out and placed in a new (identical) body?

Does the person who existed when you were eight still exist? If so, are you he/she? If not, does the person you were when you started reading this post still exist?

Just a few thoughts brought on by being sick at home all day. Enjoy.

[Schizm]

Sobek, if you read Science Fiction novels, try Kiln People, by David Brin. I think you'd find it interesting.

[Pigs in Space]

What, exactly, is the "self"?
I think the notion of self is literally what your physical senses interact with, then filtered through your mind - which is constructed by your previous experiences, causing you to experience the current situation differently than anyone else would - hence the "self" part.

Take the Star Trek transporter than disintegrates then reintegrates you. Is that a transfer of self, or some sort of spiritual clone?

I'd have to say it's just a transfer of self to a new location, as nothing really has changed, with regard to how you interpret what is around you.

If you could download all your memories into a positronic brain-type computer immediately before your body died, would you still be alive? Would the computer be you? What if your body didn't die and you just copied yourself?

So assuming the computer has exactly the same sort of operation as your brain (which is a computer), I reckon it would be a good bet to say that yes, you continue conciousness, and the computer is you. Now if you cloned yourself, there is now two of you - and two selves, because, (even though the selves are exactly the same at the time of creation) the two clones will experience things differently - starting with being in different physical positions at the time of cloning.

What if, after death, all our memories are merged into a collective unconscious? Would that be continuity of self? What if your memories were pulled back out and placed in a new (identical) body?

This is all very Buddhist, now, isn't it? I think that is actually kindof what does happen.
Anyway, it is a continutity of self - of a sorts - in that you are merged with the global conciousness. So your "self" still exists, but your awareness would be far broader in perspective. Possibly you would realize that the "self" you previously experienced as an insignificant thing. Still, it's memories and an understanding of your self's operation would exist.

Now if you were stuck in a new identical body - if you no longer had the perspective available and connection to the great collective unconciousness, you'd be a new self again.

Does the person who existed when you were eight still exist? If so, are you he/she? If not, does the person you were when you started reading this post still exist?
Hmmm, philosophy and semantics? I could go either way with these. I'm going to say yes, the person does exist and yes I am still the same person after reading and replying to this - but I am evolved from there. I have gained/lost as a result of those interactions. I think I would view the self as an evolving/devolving entity, rather than something that is recreated every time it changes.

Just a few thoughts brought on by being sick at home all day. Enjoy.
This brought to you by "Wasting Time at Work with Coopers" TM.

[Ergeheilalt]

Oooh. I wrote an Essay on The Self when I took a philosophy class. I generally still agree with it.

It could be said that man spends much of his time looking outward, seeking to understand the world around him, finding a means of survival with the goal of flourishing. It seems querulous that man should spend so much time devoted to outward vision and thought. For a small few it is what goes on behind that observing, the wheels turning and the thought processes steaming along, that provides endless fascination. By consulting the writings of three very different philosophers and meshing their ideas into a congruent statement, the answer as to what the “self” is will be finally put to an equitable rest.

Before one can explain the self, one needs understand what “the self” means. The idea of self is what makes each person’s identity unique. Philosophers try to explain what makes one person different from another, how identity works between time A and time B, and how identity can change through time.

Of all the philosophical catch phrases to make it into the lexicon of the world language, none is more famous than Descartes’ declaration, “I think, therefore I am,” or more appropriately, “I am a thinking thing that thinks, therefore I am.” In his second meditation, Rene Descartes explores the definition of the self, that which defines the personal identity of every man, woman, and child. Descartes comes up with a solution to describe the self as an entity associated with the body, but at the same time an independent entity, called the thinking substance. This thinking substance is unique to each individual and acts as the source of one’s personal identity. The belief in two separate entities defining an individual (their body and their thinking substance) is called dualism.

Descartes noted that the self only makes itself evident when one takes an introspective look at themselves. Unfortunately, Descartes’ theory on the self as an independent entity lacks logical evidence. The self cannot be seen, touched, or scientifically verified; this is ultimately true for all definitions of personal identity. Unlike most definitions of the self, Descartes conjures up some “substance” that exists; however, at the same time does not exist in the same plane of existence as the tangible. This is akin to saying that the self exists in a completely separate realm as that of the body, a desk, an apple, the Sun, everything that a person could come in contact with. Descartes does not provide for the existence of a thinking blob of ethereal neurons, instead, he says that it apparent that it exists for anyone who does the mental footwork to identify it. Descartes’ view on personal identity has one basic flaw that makes it questionable by people at large, his seemingly unexplained invention of a thinking substance. One does not invent an entity to explain something that exceeds one’s ability to firmly grasp.

A second flaw in Descartes’ work on personal identity springs from the often experienced changing persona. Although there are elements at work inside the self that undergo only marginal changes with time, there are glaring examples of times when a person’s identity changes seemingly without cause. To better understand the idea of radically changing persona, one must have a clear example to examine. Take for example, a person who lives their life as would most other people, they have a job, a family, a routine. At some point in time T1 their personality changes drastically, no longer are the things they enjoyed pleasurable, but rather they are nowhere near the same person, mere likes and dislikes are no longer sufficient to define the change. This form of psychosis leaves the person radically warped, and could be caused insanity, schizophrenia, or any number of psychological disorders.

While Descartes isn’t expected to know why or how these changes occur, it seems that it happens often enough that his general theory on personal identity should seek to account for such changes in self. A person subject to psychosis is by definition no longer the person they were prior to T1, the time when the psychotic persona became dominant. Unfortunately, Descartes does not find it necessary to explain just how the self changes with time; yet, there are clear and distinct cases where the self makes some radical change and is no longer the same as the self prior to said change. There is a logical gap that needs to be filled, so one - by necessity - must discard Descartes’ dualism in favor of something more consistent with the world as it is experienced.

Much like anything else, the self undergoes changes with time. Like the waves of the world’s oceans lapping against the shores of land, one’s own personal identity can be washed away by experience or freshly renewed by the incoming tide. David Hume makes the case that the self, and thereby the personal identity, are given shape by so-called “bundles” of experience. Hume places significant importance on these bundles of experience, stating that the very nature of experience is what defines unique identities for humanity. Upon introspection, a person should find that what defines them is their perception; therefore, the self is not a thing like Descartes’ thinking substance, but rather a subjective point of experience. For example, a set of identical twins is born at the same time on the same date, going through life together, eventually venturing down their separate paths upon reaching adulthood. Now, twin A is made of the exact same stuff as twin B, having had the same parents and sharing the same genetic makeup, they are identical physically. Hume’s bundles of experience accounts for each twin having their own unique, perspective of experience, thereby unique personal identity. Since the self is made up from bundles of experience, the twins’ identities are derived from their unique experiences.

These bundles are made up of experiences that share some common ground and Hume goes so far as to list what characteristics they can share and how they each operate. Resemblance is the idea that bundles of experience can share similar thoughts and perceptions over a period of time, while causation creates a link between two chronologically dissimilar experiences when one thought leads to another. The concept of contiguity allows for experiences to be chronologically linked. Through Hume’s explanation of experience “bundles”, one can then assign a identity to this daisy chain of interlinked experiences, and although one may not remember what happened two weeks ago, at eleven to four in the afternoon, one can follow the links progressively further back in time, eventually arriving at the date and time of a specific experience. Hume’s ideas for how personal identity certainly work for the vast majority of the population; however, there is no clear explanation for various the forms of psychosis in which a person looses their original personality. Hume does not sufficiently account for these types of identity changes. Take the psychosis example used earlier; the two separate points in time, the time prior to T1 and the time after T1, are linked chronologically. By using Hume’s logic in identifying relationships between experiences, one could link the psychotic state (existing after T1) to the non-psychotic state (existing prior to T1) because they are chronologically adjacent, thereby fulfilling the contiguity argument for the change in personal identity. Although Hume does progress to a logical level of identification of the self, his definition Hume is very close to reaching a solid definition, but falls short in the lack of an explicit definition the provides for rapid, dramatic changes in persona.

It is John Locke, the instrumental philosopher who influenced the writing of the Declaration of Independence, who makes a strong case for personal identity in all humans, including those who are not in complete control of their faculties at some point in time. Like Hume, Locke believes that one’s personality does, in fact, change with time; however, unlike Hume, Locke states that is the concatenation of memories that provides personal identity. The sameness of rational consciousness is integral for defining a person. Again, consider the example of the person having underwent psychosis at time T1. Now, miraculously, they recover. The old identity re-emerges at time T2 and recalls nothing of the prior personality’s actions, believes, or ideas. Hume’s bundle theory does not provide a sufficient answer, rather it suggests that they are causally and contiguously the same person. Descartes’ thinking substance theory says that they are just two differing aspects of the same substance. It is Locke’s idea that provides a suitable defense for the manic person’s actions when the original personality appears. Locke suggests that the domino effect present in one’s memories can be interrupted by lunacy and since a personal identity requires a series of contiguous memories, it is therefore logical to state that the personality of the psychotic person is not the same personality after entering a psychotic state. Rather, because the two personalities recall nothing of one another, that is, their memories do not link, Locke’s theory states that the two entities are entirely different from one another and are not the same.

The concept of personal identity seems easy to grasp on the surface; however, as other philosophers have demonstrated, there are subtle trends that must be identified and explained. The concept of personal identity is best defined by a union of both Hume’s and Locke’s work; in so much as the fact that they share so much in common and both fill in the voids in each other’s work quite well. Hume provides a blueprint for experience bundles, defining what floats through the mind of a person changing with time, while Locke offers an idea that it is the contiguity of memory that defines a person. However, if a memory is solely the recollection of an event or action, then it is necessary to incorporate Hume’s idea of experience bundles. By defining an experience bundle as the reasoning, feelings, thoughts, and ideas behind an action and the view point of that action, there is now something that symbolizes everything that makes a personality unique. By taking Hume’s idea of experience bundles and lodging them insides Locke’s theory in place of memory, one now can explain the ideas behind personal identity completely, without having to worry about interruptions by alter egos, disease, or lunacy.


I don't know what happened to my conclusion - I know I wrote one, but it was 3 years ago. :o I refer to my self theory as the Locke-Humian Bastardized Theory of the Self. My prof didn't like that title, so I just called it Dualism of a Different Sort: Unifying Lock and Hume's theories of the self.

[Northcott]

I think, therefore I am -- whether that is organic, mechanical, genuine, or funky sim-artificial life, it doesn't matter. I think, I feel, I react to my world. I am.

This is also an illusion. The separation of self from the rest of the world is merely the boundaries of safety and comfort enforced. So does the 8 year old me still exist? Yes. And no.

Funky musings.

[Ancalagon]

Some have said that we are meant to be one with the universe. Our existence, and the very nature of time itself, is defined by us saying "not yet".

[Kwalish Kid]

Y'all might want to listen to this: http://podcast.cbc.ca/mp3/ideas_20071001_3363.mp3

Second Life and First

In a Calgary Institute for the Humanities seminar, cyberspace researchers Abby Goodrum and Kirsten Pullen explore the confusions and contradictions of online identity, and ponder how the virtual world may be altering our sense of community, and of ourselves.

It will only be available for a couple of weeks.